s client, and that
he would then proceed to show how utterly futile was the argument.

A good deal of his early life on the circuit was passed with Lee, then
the leader of the northern circuit, and a man of great vigour of mind. A
curious question once rose between them on professional morality. At
supper one night, Scott made the remark, that Lee always exerted himself
to gain a verdict by a display of his great legal knowledge; but not
always with a regard to the accuracy of either his law or his facts. Lee
contended that it was the duty of counsel to state what the party
himself would have stated, and get a verdict if he could. He, however,
pondered on it; and, as they were retiring for the night, said, "Scott,
I have been thinking of the question you asked me; and I am not _quite_
sure that the conduct you represented will bring a man peace at the
last."

Lord Eldon quotes Johnson's opinion, which had been referred to--and
which stated that it was the duty of counsel, after having stated the
law and the facts exactly, to exert his abilities to the utmost to gain
his cause--the judge being supposed the abler lawyer, and the reasoning
of the bench amending what was erroneous in that of the bar. Lord Eldon
adds, in his rather too dubious way--"It may be questioned whether even
this can be supported." Of course it may. The object of law is to do
justice; and justice is not done if the ingenuity of an able advocate is
entitled to gain a false verdict. For how is this to be gained? Either
by a suppression of the truth in part, or by a colouring of the
falsehood, or by an invention of facts, aided by a misinterpretation of
law; all palpably against conscience. The true rule appears to be--the
lawyer stands in the place of the client, to do what the client would
and could have done, if he had equal skill in exhibiting the
circumstances, and equal knowledge of the law which bore upon them. But
as the client has no right to tell an untruth of any kind for himself,
so neither has the lawyer the right to tell it for him. The lawyer's
taking a brief in a cause of which he has a bad opinion, is wholly a
different matter. The custom of the bar justly decides that he must not
refuse the brief, because he cannot be sure that he knows the whole
cause; for facts unexpected, and even unknown, may start up; he may be
mistaken in his personal conception of the facts, the motives, and the
law: new facts may come out on the trial. There i