as words could go
contended on his behalf in favour of the right, considering every man
an enemy to gods and to men who did not wish Pompeius to be
victorious. Caesar also showed much moderation in his success, for
after he had captured and defeated the forces of Pompeius in
Iberia,[358] he let the generals go and employed the troops. After
crossing the Alps again and hurrying through Italy, he arrived at
Brundisium about the winter solstice. He then crossed the sea and
putting in at Oricum sent Jubius,[359] a friend of Pompeius, who was
his prisoner, to Pompeius[360] to propose that they should both meet
together on the third day, disband all their forces, and after being
reconciled and confirming their union by oath, return to Italy.
Pompeius again considered this to be an ambuscade, and hastily going
down to the sea he took possession of the posts and places which
presented very strong positions for an army; he also seized the naval
stations and landing places which were favourable for those who came
by sea, so that every wind which blew brought to Pompeius corn or
troops or money; but Caesar being confined in straits both on the sea
and land side was of necessity glad to fight, and he attacked the
lines of Pompeius and continually provoked him to battle, in which
Caesar had generally the advantage and the superiority in the
skirmishing. But on one occasion he narrowly escaped being completely
crushed and losing his army, for Pompeius fought with great courage
and routed all the enemy, who lost two thousand men; but he was
either unable or was afraid to force his way into Caesar's camp and to
enter with the fugitives, which made Caesar say to his friends, "To-day
the victory would have been with the enemy, if they had had a
commander who knew how to conquer."

LXVI. The partisans of Pompeius being greatly elated at this success
were eager to have a decisive battle. Pompeius wrote to the distant
kings and generals and cities to inform them that he was victorious,
but he feared the risk of a battle, thinking that by delay and
reducing the enemy to straits he should finally vanquish men who were
invincible in arms and had long been accustomed to conquer together,
but as to the other military duties, and marches, and change of
position, and digging of trenches and building of walls, were not
efficient by reason of age and on this account were eager to come to
close fighting and to engage hand to hand. However, previous