had in human
affairs for the safety of the public funds and the practicability of
a new system of collection and disbursement through the agency of the
State banks.

From all these considerations the President thinks that the State banks
ought immediately to be employed in the collection and disbursement of
the public revenue, and the funds now in the Bank of the United States
drawn out with all convenient dispatch. The safety of the public moneys
if deposited in the State banks must be secured beyond all reasonable
doubts; but the extent and nature of the security, in addition to their
capital, if any be deemed necessary, is a subject of detail to which the
Treasury Department will undoubtedly give its anxious attention. The
banks to be employed must remit the moneys of the Government without
charge, as the Bank of the United States now does; must render all the
services which that bank now performs; must keep the Government advised
of their situation by periodical returns; in fine, in any arrangement
with the State banks the Government must not in any respect be placed on
a worse footing than it now is. The President is happy to perceive by
the report of the agent that the banks which he has consulted have, in
general, consented to perform the service on these terms, and that those
in New York have further agreed to make payments in London without other
charge than the mere cost of the bills of exchange.

It should also be enjoined upon any banks which may be employed that
it will be expected of them to facilitate domestic exchanges for the
benefit of internal commerce; to grant all reasonable facilities to the
payers of the revenue; to exercise the utmost liberality toward the
other State banks, and do nothing uselessly to embarrass the Bank of
the United States.

As one of the most serious objections to the Bank of the United States
is the power which it concentrates, care must be taken in finding other
agents for the service of the Treasury not to raise up another power
equally formidable. Although it would probably be impossible to produce
such a result by any organization of the State banks which could be
devised, yet it is desirable to avoid even the appearance. To this end
it would be expedient to assume no more power over them and interfere no
more in their affairs than might be absolutely necessary to the security
of the public deposit and the faithful performance of their duties
as agents of the Treasury