e the instructions
for my conduct in the probable case of a rejection of the law.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.

[Footnote 12: A memoir to be laid before the commission which may be
appointed to examine the law, intended to contain all the arguments and
facts by which it is to be supported.]

WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have received the resolution of the Senate of the 2d instant,
requesting me to communicate copies of the charges, if any, which may
have been made to me against the official conduct of Gideon Fitz, late
surveyor-general south of the State of Tennessee, which caused his
removal from office.

The resolution is preceded by a preamble which alleges as reasons for
this request that the causes which may have produced the removal of the
officer referred to may contain information necessary to the action of
the Senate on the nomination of his successor and to the investigation
now in progress respecting the frauds in the sales of the public lands.

This is another of those calls for information made upon me by the
Senate which have, in my judgment, either related to the subjects
exclusively belonging to the executive department or otherwise
encroached on the constitutional powers of the Executive. Without
conceding the right of the Senate to make either of these requests,
I have yet, for the various reasons heretofore assigned in my several
replies, deemed it expedient to comply with several of them. It is now,
however, my solemn conviction that I ought no longer, from any motive
nor in any degree, to yield to these unconstitutional demands. Their
continued repetition imposes on me, as the representative and trustee of
the American people, the painful but imperious duty of resisting to the
utmost any further encroachment on the rights of the Executive. This
course is especially due to the present resolution. The President in
cases of this nature possesses the exclusive power of removal from
office, and, under the sanctions of his official oath and of his
liability to impeachment, he is bound to exercise it whenever the public
welfare shall require. If, on the other hand, from corrupt motives he
abuses this power, he is exposed to the same responsibilities. On no
principle known to our institutions can he be required to account
for the manner in which he discharges this portion of his public
duties, save only in the mode and under the