ose placing the navigation and trade between the dominions of Great
Britain and the territories of the United States, on a basis of complete
reciprocity. By acceding to such a measure England might have gained
much and could have lost but little. The proposal was rejected almost
with terms of insult, and Mr. Adams was sternly informed that a "no
other would be entertained." The consequences were that the free negroes
of Jamaica, and others of the poorer inhabitants of the British West
India Islands were reduced to starvation by being deprived of their
usual supplies from the United States. This unreasonable policy on the
part of England naturally exasperated the Americans, and one of the
first acts of the federal government in 1789 was to adopt retaliatory
measures. A navy law was passed, which has since been the foundation of
all our treaties of reciprocity with England. A protective tariff was
also adopted as another means of retaliation. In these measures, the
United States, being a young nation with unlimited territory, had
everything to gain, and England all to lose. Great Britain was first to
tire of restrictive measures, and, by a repeal on her part, invited a
repeal on ours.

In another way Great Britain exasperated the popular feeling here
against her, and even forced the American government, once or twice, to
the verge of war. By the treaty of peace, all military posts held by
England within the limits of the United States were to be given up.
Michilimacinac, Detroit, Oswegotche, Point au Fer and Dutchman's Point
were long held in defiance of the compact. These posts became the centre
of intrigues among the savages of the Northwest. Arms were here
distributed to the Indians, and disturbances on the American frontier
were fomented. The war on the Miami, which was brought to a bloody close
by Wayne's victory, was, principally, the result of such secret
machinations. In short, England regarded the treaty of 1783 as a truce
rather than a pacification, and long, held to the hope of being able yet
to punish the colonies for their rebellion. In two celebrated letters
written by John Adams from Great Britain, he used the following decided
language in reference to the secret designs of England:

"If she can bind Holland in her shackles, and France from internal
dissensions is unable to interfere, she will make war immediately
against us." This was in 1787. Two years before he had expressed, the
same ideas. "Their pres