u by a few observations,
and concluded his answer by returning to his first plan--that
Pichegru should proclaim the King without passing the Rhine, and
should give up Huningen; that then the army of Conde by itself, and
without the aid of the Austrians, would join him. In that case he
could promise 100,000 crowns in louis, which he had at Bale, and
1,400,000 livres, which he had in good bills payable at sight.
No argument or entreaty had any effect on the Prince de Condo. The
idea of communicating his plan to Wurmser and sharing his glory with
him rendered him blind and deaf to every consideration. However, it
was necessary to report to Pichegru the observations of the Prince
de Conde, and Courant was commissioned to do so.
This document appeared so interesting to me that while Bonaparte was
sleeping I was employed in copying it. Notwithstanding posterior and
reiterated denials of its truth, I believe it to be perfectly correct.
Napoleon had ordered plans of his most famous battles to be engraved, and
had paid in advance for them. The work was not done quickly enough for
him. He got angry, and one day said to his geographer, Bacler d'Albe,
whom he liked well enough, "Ah! do hurry yourself, and think all this is
only the business of a moment. If you make further delay you will sell
nothing; everything is soon forgotten!"
We were now in July, and the negotiations were carried on with a
tardiness which showed that something was kept in reserve on both sides.
Bonaparte at this time was anything but disposed to sign a peace, which
he always hoped to be able to make at Vienna, after a campaign in
Germany, seconded by the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-et-Meuse.
The minority of the Directory recommended peace on the basis of the
preliminaries, but the majority wished for more honourable and
advantageous terms; while Austria, relying on troubles breaking out in
France, was in no haste to conclude a treaty. In these circumstances
Bonaparte drew up a letter to be sent to the Emperor of Austria, in which
he set forth the moderation of France; but stated that, in consequence of
the many delays, nearly all hope of peace had vanished. He advised the
Emperor not to rely on difficulties arising in France, and doubted, if
war should continue and the Emperor be successful in the next campaign,
that he would obtain a more advantageous peace than was now at his
option. This letter was never sent
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