years. This, again, was one of the important and conspicuous compromises
of the Constitution. It is liable, however, to be misunderstood, for one
should not read into the sentiment of the members of the Convention
any of the later strong prejudice against slavery. There were some
who objected on moral grounds to the recognition of slavery in the
Constitution, and that word was carefully avoided by referring to "such
Persons as any States now existing shall think proper to admit." And
there were some who were especially opposed to the encouragement of
that institution by permitting the slave trade, but the majority of the
delegates regarded slavery as an accepted institution, as a part of the
established order, and public sentiment on the slave trade was not much
more emphatic and positive than it is now on cruelty to animals. As
Ellsworth said, "The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations
belonging to the States themselves," and the compromise was nothing more
or less than a bargain between the sections.

The fundamental weakness of the Confederation was the inability of the
Government to enforce its decrees, and in spite of the increased powers
of Congress, even including the use of the militia "to execute the
laws of the Union," it was not felt that this defect had been entirely
remedied. Experience under the Confederation had taught men that
something more was necessary in the direction of restricting the
States in matters which might interfere with the working of the central
Government. As in the case of the powers of Congress, the Articles of
Confederation were again resorted to and the restrictions which had
been placed upon the States in that document were now embodied in the
Constitution with modifications and additions. But the final touch was
given in connection with the judiciary.

There was little in the printed draft and there is comparatively little
in the Constitution on the subject of the judiciary. A Federal Supreme
Court was provided for, and Congress was permitted, but not required, to
establish inferior courts; while the jurisdiction of these tribunals was
determined upon the general principles that it should extend to cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to
treaties and cases in which foreigners and foreign countries were
involved, and to controversies between States and citizens of different
States. Nowhere in the document itself is there any word as to tha