nd
intelligence to direct the labor, and feeds and clothes the slaves. The
slaves, therefore, are entitled only to a part of the proceeds of their
labor, while the master is also justly entitled to a part of the crop.
When brought into the market, the purchaser can not know what part
belongs, rightfully, to the master, and what to his slaves, as the whole
is offered in bulk. He may, therefore, purchase the whole, innocently,
and throw the sinfulness of the transaction upon the master, who sells
what belongs to others. But if the _per se_ doctrine be true, this
apology for the purchaser is not a justification. Where a "confusion of
goods" has been made by one of the owners, so that they can not be
separated, he who "confused" them can have no advantage, in law, from
his own wrong, but the goods are awarded to the innocent party. On this
well known principle of law, this most equitable rule, the master
forfeits his right in the property, and the purchaser, knowing the
facts, becomes a party in his guilt. But aside from this, the "confusion
of goods," by the master, can give him no moral right to dispose of the
interest of his slaves therein for his own benefit; and the persons
purchasing such property, acquire no moral right to its possession and
use. These are sound, logical views. The argument offered, in
justification of those who hold that slavery is _malum in se_, is the
strongest that can be made. It is apparent, then, from a fair analysis
of their own principles, that they are _participes criminis_ with
slaveholders.

Again, if the laws regulating the institution of slavery, be morally
null and void, and not binding on the conscience, then the slaves have a
moral right to the proceeds of their labor. This right can not be
alienated by any act of the master, but attaches to the property
wherever it may be taken, and to whomsoever it may be sold. This
principle, in law, is also well established. The recent decision on the
"Gardiner fraud," confirms it; the Court asserting, that the money paid
out of the Treasury of the United States, under such circumstances,
continued its character as the money and property of the United States,
and may be followed into the hands of those who cashed the orders of
Gardiner, and subsequently drew the money, but who are not the true
owners of the said fund; and decreeing that the amount of funds, thus
obtained, be collected off the estate of said Gardiner, and off those
who drew funds