ompany proceed to a community of freemen, on the coast of
Africa, who have labored voluntarily during the year, seize their
persons, bind them, convey away their horses, cattle, hogs, and cotton,
and take the property to market. The first association represents the
slaveholders; the second a band of robbers. The commodities of both
parties, are openly offered for sale, and every one knows how the
property of each was obtained. Those who believe the _per se_ doctrine,
place both these associations in the same moral category, and call them
robbers. Judged by this rule, the first band are the more criminal, as
they have deprived their victims of personal liberty, forced them into
servitude, and then "despoiled them of the fruits of their labor."[92]
The second band have only deprived their victims of liberty, while they
robbed them; and thus have committed but two crimes, while the first
have perpetrated three. These parties attempt to negotiate the sale of
their cotton, say in London. The first company dispose of their cargo
without difficulty--no one manifesting the slightest scruple at
purchasing the products of slave labor. But the second company are not
so fortunate. As soon as their true character is ascertained, the police
drag its members to Court, where they are sentenced to Bridewell. In
vain do these robbers quote the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Convention,
and Daniel O'Connell, to prove that their cotton was obtained by means
no more criminal than that of the slaveholders, and that, therefore,
judgment ought to be reversed. The Court will not entertain such a
plea, and they have to endure the penalty of the law. Now, why this
difference, if slavery be _malum in se_? And if the receiver of stolen
property is _particeps criminis_ with the thief, why is it, that the
Englishman, who should receive and sell the cotton of the robbers, would
run the risk of being sent to prison with them, while if he acted as
agent of the slaveholders, he would be treated as an honorable man? If
the master has no moral right to hold his slaves, in what respect can
the products of their labor differ from the property acquired by
robbery? And if the property be the fruits of robbery, how can any one
use it, without violating conscience?

We have met with the following sage exposition of the question, in
justification of the use of slave labor products, by those who believe
the _per se_ doctrine: The master owns the lands, gives his skill a