became willing to allow
slavery extension in the Southwest; and, even then, their assent was
reluctantly given--the markets for cotton, doubtless, being considered
sufficiently limited for the territory under cultivation. Up to 1824,
the Indians held over thirty-two millions of acres of land in Georgia,
Mississippi, and Alabama, and over twenty millions of acres in Florida,
Missouri and Arkansas; which was mostly retained by them as late as
1836. Although the States interested had repeatedly urged the matter
upon Congress, and some of them even resorted to forcible means to gain
possession of these Indian lands, the Government did not fulfill its
promise to remove the Indians until 1836; and even then, the measure met
with such opposition, that it was saved but by one vote--Mr. Calhoun and
six other Southern Senators voting against it.[32] In justice to Mr.
Calhoun, however, it must be stated that his opposition to the measure
was based on the conviction that the treaty had been fraudulently
obtained.

The older States, however, had found, by this time, that the foreign and
home demand for cotton was so rapidly increasing that there was little
danger of over-production; and that they had, in fact, secured to
themselves the monopoly of the foreign markets. Beside this, the
abolition movement at that moment, had assumed its most threatening
aspect, and was demanding the destruction of slavery or the dissolution
of the Union. Here was a double motive operating to produce harmony in
the ranks of Southern politicians, and to awaken the fears of many,
North and South, for the safety of the Government. Here, also, was the
origin of the determination, in the South, to extend slavery, by the
annexation of territory, so as to gain the political preponderance in
the National Councils, and to protect its interests against the
interference of the North.

It was not the increased demand for cotton, alone, that served as a
protection to the older States. The extension of its cultivation, in the
degree demanded by the wants of commerce, could only be effected by a
corresponding increased supply of provisions. Without this, it could not
increase, except by enhancing their price to the injury of the older
States. This food did not fail to be in readiness, so soon as it was
needed. Indeed, much of it had long been awaiting an outlet to a
profitable market. Its surplus, too, had been somewhat increased by the
Temperance movement in the N