umner; but we cannot accept his mere
opinion as authority that the power of Congress to enact such a law is
so glaringly unconstitutional, is so monstrously absurd; for, however
passionately that opinion may be declaimed, we cannot forget that a
Fugitive Slave Law was passed by the Congress of 1793, received the
signature of George Washington, and, finally, the judicial sanction of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Sumner is but a man.

This advantage of mixing up with a glaring falsehood the idea he wishes
to be rejected is not the only one which Mr. Sumner derives from his man
of straw. By combating the position--"the popular belief," as he calls
it--that "slavery is a national institution," he lays open a wide field
for his peculiar powers of declamation. He calls up all the
fathers--North and South--to bear witness against slavery, in order to
show that it is not a national institution. He quotes colleges, and
churches, and patriots, against slavery. Not content with this, he pours
down furious invectives of his own, with a view to render slavery as
odious as possible. But, since the simple question is, _What saith the
Constitution_--why this fierce crusade against slavery? In deciding this
very question, namely, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793, a high judicial authority has said that "the abstract
proposition of the justice or injustice of slavery is wholly irrelevant
here, and, I apprehend, ought not to have the slightest influence upon
any member of this court."[211]

It ought not to have--and it did not have--the slightest influence on
the highest judicial tribunal of New York, in which the above opinion
was delivered. Much as the author of that opinion (Mr. Senator Bishop)
abhorred slavery, he did not permit such an influence to reach his
judgment. It would have contaminated his judicial integrity. But
although before a judicial tribunal, about to decide on the
constitutionality of a Fugitive Slave Law, the abstract proposition of
the justice or injustice of slavery is out of place, yet at the bar of
passion and prejudice it is well calculated, as Mr. Sumner must know, to
exert a tremendous influence. Hence, if he can only get up the horror of
his readers against slavery before he comes to the real question,
namely, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, he knows that
his victory will be more than half gained. But we admonish him that
passion and prejudice can only g