om a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the
fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for
judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where
his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by
giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work
conflict.

8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General
Wallace and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving
the enemy at every point.

9th. That a movement at that time, toward Pittsburg Landing, would have
taken General Wallaces' Division out of possible contact with the enemy,
instead of supporting, and perfecting victory.

10th. That when the Division of General Wallace moved, as it did, within
ten minutes after receipt of the orders, "impatiently waited for," it
could see the distant smoke and hear the roar of battle, and moved
directly toward the point of danger by the shortest route, with the
greatest celerity and in harmony with the order received.

11th. That the defeat of the main army, the enforced retirement of
Sherman's Division, and, in fact, the withdrawal of the entire original
line, were new conditions, to be considered, when other Staff Officers
notified General Wallace of the same; and then, the addition of his
division to the rallying army, at Pittsburg Landing, seemed to be an
important element to the very safety of that army, except as it could
lean upon the divisions of Buel, already within supporting distance.

12th. That the original advance of General Wallace's Division on the
Purdy Road, while thoroughly suited to the original conditions as they
existed when the order was delivered to him, was, of necessity, useless
and dangerous, when he found himself alone and unsupported, and that the
enemy had already swept over the position which he expected to occupy.

13th. That there was no alternative, then, but to pass around the left
of the enemy, and rejoin the army, at such expense of time or labor as
the new conditions imposed; and that this was done, at great pains and
with great celerity, without straggling or loss.

14th. That the prominent idea of withdrawing General Wallace's Division
from Crump's Landing, to support the main army in its advance, is to be
kept in mind;--whereby, confusion ceases as to the hour of the day when
the order to report at Pittsburg Landing was delivered or became
operative;--thereby, also,