mal souls, including the
irrational soul of man. But in man, who would otherwise be merely
analogous to other terrestrial animals--this soul participates in a
higher principle, which tends to raise and convert it to itself. To
comprehend the nature of this union or hypostasis it would be necessary
to have mastered the whole of Plato's philosophy as comprised in the
Parmenides and the Timaeus; and he would dogmatize rashly who without
this arduous preparation should claim Plato as the champion of an
unconditional immortality. Certainly in the Phaedo the dialogue
popularly supposed to contain all Plato's teaching on the subject--the
immortality allotted to the impure soul is of a very questionable
character, and we should rather infer from the account there given that
the human personality, at all events, is lost by successive immersions
into "matter." The following passage from Plutarch (quoted by Madame
Blavatsky, "Isis Unveiled," vol. ii. p. 284) will at least demonstrate
the antiquity of notions which have recently been mistaken for fanciful
novelties. "Every soul hath some portion of nous, reason, a man cannot
be a man without it; but as much of each soul as is mixed with flesh
and appetite is changed, and through pain and pleasure becomes
irrational. Every soul doth not mix herself after one sort; some
plunge themselves into the body, and so in this life their whole frame
is corrupted by appetite and passion; others are mixed as to some part,
but the purer part still remains without the body. It is not drawn down
into the body, but it swims above, and touches the extremest part of the
man's head; it is like a cord to hold up and direct the subsiding part
of the soul, as long as it proves obedient and is not overcome by the
appetites of the flesh. The part that is plunged into the body is
called soul. But the incorruptible part is called the nous, and the
vulgar think it is within them, as they likewise imagine the image
reflected from a glass to be in that glass. But the more intelligent,
who know it to be without, call it a Daemon." And in the same learned
work ("Isis Unveiled ") we have two Christian authorities, Irenaeus and
Origen, cited for like distinction between spirit and soul in such a
manner as to show that the former must necessarily be regarded as
separable from the latter. In the distinction itself there is of course
no novelty for the most moderately well-informed. It is insisted upon