ircumstances which might modify the results mentioned in the text.
For example, let us revert to the first case, that in which the demand
for cloth in Germany is so little affected by the rise of price in
consequence of the tax, that the quantity bought exceeds in pecuniary
value what it was before. As the German consumers lay out more money in
cloth, they have less to lay out in other things; other money prices
will fall; among the rest that of linen; and this may so increase the
demand for linen in England as to restore the equilibrium of exports and
imports without any passage of money. But England's treasury will still
gain from Germany the whole of the tax, and the English people will buy
their linen cheaper besides. Again, in the opposite case, where the tax
so diminishes the demand, that a smaller pecuniary value is required
than before. The German consumers have, therefore, more to expend in
other things; these, and among the rest linen, will rise; and this may
so diminish the demand for linen in England, as to restore the
equilibrium without the transmission of money. But the effect, as
respects the division of the advantage, is still as stated in the text.

[4] The world at large, sellers and buyers taken together, is
always a gainer by underselling. If, in the case supposed, England were
compelled by a commercial treaty to exclude the linen of Flanders from
her market, the total wealth of the world, if affected at all, would be
diminished.

For, what is the cause which enables Flanders to undersell Germany? That
Flanders, if she had the trade, would exchange linen for cloth at a rate
of interchange more advantageous to England. And why can Flanders do so?
It must be either because Flanders can produce the article with a less
comparative quantity of labour than Germany, and therefore the total
advantage to be divided between the two countries is greater in the case
of Flanders than of Germany; or else because, though the total advantage
is not greater, Flanders obtains a less share of it, her demand for
cloth being greater, at the same rate of interchange, than that of
Germany. In the former case, to exclude Flemish linen from England would
be to prevent the world at large from making a greater saving of labour
instead of a less. In the latter, the exclusion would be inefficacious
for the only end it could be intended for, viz., the benefit of Germany,
unless Flemish money were excluded from England as well as