e
crossing hurrying over Brown's division. When Brown got over he could
support either Cleburne or Bate, as developments might dictate. Uncandid
statements have been made that Cheatham's divisions were moved around in
a disjointed manner and without any plan. There was not only a logical
plan but a successful plan, if it had been carried out, in the orders
given to Cheatham's divisions. The other four divisions were halted
south of Rutherford's creek, and fronted into line facing west towards
the Columbia pike. This proves that it was then Hood's belief that
Schofield's main body was still at Duck river. If it should march up the
pike and attack Bate, the four divisions would be on its flank. If it
should attempt to reach the fortifications at Murfreesboro by cutting
across the country south of Spring Hill the four divisions would be in a
position to intercept it.

General Bradley had four regiments in line in the woods on the ridge,
with the left towards the Rally Hill road and the right trending away
towards the pike. They faced in a southeasterly direction. To cover more
ground there were short gaps between the regiments. The 65th Ohio was
the right regiment of the four, and to the right rear of the 65th was a
gap of a couple hundred yards extending out into cleared land, where the
42d Illinois was posted, refused as to the 65th and facing south to
cover that flank. To the front, right and rear of the 42d was a broad
expanse of rolling fields extending on the right to the pike, about
1,000 yards away, where two guns were posted to sweep the fields in
front of the 42d with their fire. To the left of the 42d an extension of
the woods ran out into the fields and concealed the 42d from Cleburne
until he had advanced almost abreast of its position. When the 64th came
off the skirmish line it was sent to the support of the 42d. The 36th
Illinois, Opdycke's only reserve, was hurried across on double-quick
from the other side of Spring Hill to support the two guns at the pike.
As many guns of the reserve artillery as could be utilized were placed
in battery around the southeasterly skirt of the village, looking
towards Bradley's position. Bradley's men very hastily had constructed
weak barricades of rails or anything else they could lay their hands on.
The 42d had such protection as was afforded by a rail fence.

Shortly before 4 o'clock, having completed his formation, Cleburne
started to march across to the pike. His divi