ing on wheels belonging to our
army--ambulances, artillery carriages and army wagons to the number of
about 800 vehicles. The nearest support was Ruger's two brigades, eight
miles away, and it was about an hour later before Ruger had started for
Spring Hill. Opdycke's brigade was covering the railway station and the
Franklin pike on the north, and Lane's brigade the Mount Carmel road on
the east. They had a connected line, but it was so long that much of it
consisted of skirmishers only. They had in their front detachments of
Forrest's cavalry feeling along their line for an opening to get at the
trains. Bradley's brigade occupied an advanced, detached position, on
the ridge to the southeast that has been mentioned, to cover the
approach by the Rally Hill road. There was a gap of half a mile between
Lane's right in front of Spring Hill and Bradley's left, out on the
ridge. Bradley had in his immediate front the main body of Forrest's
three divisions of cavalry and the three divisions of infantry composing
Cheatham's corps, while four more divisions of infantry were within easy
supporting distance. In brief, ten of the twelve divisions, cavalry
included, composing Hood's army, were in front of Spring Hill, and at 4
o'clock Hood was attacking with his infantry Wagner's lone division,
guarding all our trains, while Schofield was still waiting for Hood at
Duck river with four divisions from eight to twelve miles away. If
Wagner's division had been wiped out, a very easy possibility for the
overwhelming numbers confronting it while stretched out on a line about
three miles long, without any breastworks, the rich prize of our
ambulance train, six batteries of artillery, and all our wagons with
their loads of supplies would have fallen into Hood's hands, and the
retreat of the four divisions would have been squarely cut off, while
having a short supply of artillery and no food or ammunition except what
the men were carrying in their haversacks and cartridge boxes. The
escape of our army from this deadly peril was largely due to the great
skill with which General Stanley handled the situation at Spring Hill,
but manifestly no amount of skill on the part of Stanley could have
saved us, where the disadvantages were so great, if the enemy had
improved with a very ordinary degree of vigor and intelligence the
opportunity opened to them by Schofield's delusion as to Hood's
intention. General Hood rode with the advance of his column un