, or what he
suffered. In comedy, therefore, this is now become evident. For comic
poets having composed a fable through things of a probable nature, they
thus give whatever names they please to their characters, and do not,
like iambic poets, write poems about particular persons. But in tragedy
they cling to real names. The cause, however, of this is, that the
possible is credible. Things therefore which have not yet been done, we
do not yet believe to be possible: but it is evident that things which
have been done are possible, for they would not have been done if they
were impossible.

Not indeed but that in some tragedies there are one or two known names,
and the rest are feigned; but in others there is no known name, as for
instance in 'The Flower of Agatho.' For in this tragedy the things and
the names are alike feigned, and yet it delights no less. Hence, one
must not seek to adhere entirely to traditional fables, which are the
subjects of tragedy. For it is ridiculous to make this the object of
search, because even known subjects are known but to a few, though at
the same time they delight all men. From these things, therefore, it is
evident that a poet ought rather to be the author of fables than of
metres, inasmuch as he is a poet from imitation, and he imitates
actions. Hence, though it should happen that he relates things which
have happened, he is no less a poet. For nothing hinders but that some
actions which have happened are such as might both probably and possibly
have happened, and by [the narration of] such he is a poet.

But of simple plots and actions, the episodic are the worst. But I call
the plot episodic, in which it is neither probable nor necessary that
the episodes follow each other. Such plots, however, are composed by bad
poets, indeed, through their own want of ability; but by good poets, on
account of the players. For, introducing [dramatic] contests, and
extending the plot beyond its capabilities, they are frequently
compelled to distort the connection of the parts. But tragedy is not
only an imitation of a perfect action, but also of actions which are
terrible and piteous, and actions principally become such (and in a
greater degree when they happen contrary to opinion) on account of each
other. For thus they will possess more of the marvelous than if they
happened from chance and fortune; since also of things which are from
fortune, those appear to be most admirable which seem to happ