(and this because it is all those in capacity), and something
which is the cause and affective, because it produces all things (in
such a manner as art is affected with respect to matter), it is
necessary that these differences should also be inherent in the soul.
And the one is an intellect of this kind because it becomes all things;
but the other because it produces all things as a certain habit, such
for instance as light. For in a certain respect, light also causes
colors which are in capacity to be colors in energy. And this intellect
is separate, unmingled, and impassive, since it is in its essence
energy; for the efficient is always more honorable than the patient, and
the principle than matter. Science, also, in energy is the same as the
thing [which is scientifically known]. But science which is in capacity
is prior in time in the one [to science in energy]; though, in short,
neither [is capacity prior to energy] in time. It does not, however,
perceive intellectually at one time and at another time not, but
separate intellect is alone this very thing which it is; and this alone
is immortal and eternal. We do not, however, remember because this is
impassive; but the passive intellect is corruptible, and without this
the separate intellect understands nothing.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HISTORY AND POETRY, AND
HOW HISTORICAL MATTER SHOULD BE USED IN POETRY

From the 'Poetics,' Chapter 9

But it is evident from what has been said that it is not the province of
a poet to relate things which have happened, but such as might have
happened, and such things as are possible according to probability, or
which would necessarily have happened. For a historian and a poet do not
differ from each other because the one writes in verse and the other in
prose; for the history of Herodotus might be written in verse, and yet
it would be no less a history with metre than without metre. But they
differ in this, that the one speaks of things which have happened, and
the other of such as might have happened. Hence, poetry is more
philosophic, and more deserving of attention, than history. For poetry
speaks more of universals, but history of particulars. But universal
consists, indeed, in relating or performing certain things which happen
to a man of a certain description, either probably or necessarily [to
which the aim of poetry is directed in giving names]; but particular
consists in narrating what [for example] Alcibiades did