ad, there remains the second question whether we
are really justified in regarding the class of actions itself as right
or wrong. Failure to prosecute for or punish heresy or witchcraft was at
one time regarded at least as wrong as failure to punish or prosecute
for theft or murder would now be. To decline to fight a duel was, till
quite recently, to place yourself outside the pale of gentlemen. A
reluctance to sacrifice herself on the funeral pile of her dead husband
was, till the practice of Suttee was abolished by the British
government, one of the most immoral traits which a Brahman widow could
exhibit. Now, have we any means of discriminating, and, if so, how do we
discriminate, between those acts which are really, and those which are
only reputed, right or wrong? That there is great need of such a test,
if it can be discovered, is plain. The wide divergences of opinion on
matters of conduct in different ages, in different countries, in
different classes of society, and even amongst men of the same class In
the same country and at the same time, shew at once the vast importance
of ascertaining some common measure of actions, and that there is no
uniform rule of right and wrong to be found in the human mind itself. If
there is such a rule, it must be derived from some external
considerations, and, if there is no such rule, then morality must be, to
a large extent, a matter of prejudice, fancy, and caprice. Now I
conceive that there is a simple mode of ascertaining whether there is
any test of actions other than the merely subjective determinations of
our own minds, or, in other words, whether there are any reasons or
external considerations by which the mind guides itself in its decisions
on matters of conduct. Do our moral opinions merely vary, or do they
grow? Is there any progress to be traced in morality, or does it simply
oscillate, within certain limits, round a fixed point? If some 'simple'
and 'innate' idea of right, or some universal sense, were the test of
morality, then we might expect that the moral decisions of all men would
be uniform, or, at least, approximately uniform; if, on the other hand,
there were no test at all, or, what amounts to much the same thing, a
merely personal test, then we might expect that the moral judgments of
mankind would vary arbitrarily according to the disposition and
temperament of each individual man. But, if there be a test derived from
external considerations and capable o