e President, himself, was for
an armistice.(9)

A great many things came swiftly to a head within a few days before or
after the twentieth of August. Every day or two, rumor took a new turn;
or some startling new alignment was glimpsed; and every one reacted to
the news after his kind. And always the feverish question, what is the
strength of the faction that approves this? Or, how far will this go
toward creating a new element in the political kaleidoscope? About the
twentieth of August, Jaquess and Gilmore threw a splashing stone into
these troubled waters. They published in The Atlantic a full account of
their interview with Davis, who, in the clearest, most unfaltering way
had told them that the Southerners were fighting for independence and
for nothing else; that no compromise over slavery; nothing but the
recognition of the Confederacy as a separate nation would induce them
to put up their bright swords. As Lincoln subsequently, in his perfect
clarity of speech, represented Davis: "He would accept nothing short of
severance of the Union--precisely what we will not and can not give....
He does not attempt to deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive
ourselves. He can not voluntarily reaccept the Union; we can not
voluntarily yield it"(10)

Whether without the intrusion of Jaquess and Gilmore, the Executive
Committee would have come to the conclusion they now reached, is a mere
speculation. They thought they were at the point of desperation. They
thought they saw a way out, a way that reminds one of Jaquess and
Gilmore. On the twenty-second, Raymond sent that letter to Lincoln about
"the tide setting strongly against us." He also proposed the Committee's
way of escape: nothing but to offer peace to Davis "on the sole
condition of acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution--all
other questions to be settled in a convention of the people of all the
States."(11) He assumed the offer would be rejected. Thus the clamor
for negotiation would be met and brought to naught. Having sent off his
letter, Raymond got his committee together and started for Washington
for a council of desperation.

And this brings us to the twenty-third of August. On that day, pondering
Raymond's letter, Lincoln took thought with himself what he should
say to the Executive Committee. A mere opportunist would have met the
situation with some insincere proposal, by the formulation of terms that
would have certainly been rejected. We hav