he also believed that if sufficient time could be given, and if no
armed clash took place, it would be demonstrated first, that they did
not have so strong a hold on the South as they had thought they had;
and second, that on the whole, it was to their interests to patch up the
quarrel and come back into the Union. But he also saw that they had a
serious problem of leadership, which, if rudely handled, might make it
impossible for them to stand still. They had inflamed the sentiment of
state-patriotism. In South Carolina, particularly, the popular demand
was for independence. With this went the demand that Fort Sumter in
Charleston Harbor, garrisoned by Federal troops, should be surrendered,
or if not surrendered, taken forcibly from the United States. A few
cannon shots at Sumter would mean war. An article in Seward's creed of
statecraft asserted that the populace will always go wild over a war. To
prevent a war fever in the North was the first condition of his policy
at home. Therefore, in order to prevent it, the first step in saving his
enemies' faces was to safeguard them against the same danger in their
own calm. He must help them to prevent a war fever in the South. He saw
but one way to do this. The conclusion which became the bed rock of his
policy was inevitable. Sumter must be evacuated.

Even before the inauguration, he had broached this idea to Lincoln. He
had tried to keep Lincoln from inserting in the inaugural the words,
"The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy and possess
the property and places belonging to the government." He had proposed
instead, "The power confided in me shall be used indeed with efficacy,
but also with discretion, in every case and exigency, according to
the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of
a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of
fraternal sympathies and affections."(6) With the rejection of Seward's
proffered revision, a difference between them in policy began to
develop. Lincoln, says one of his secretaries, accepted Seward's main
purpose but did not share his "optimism."(7) It would be truer to say
that in this stage of his development, he was lacking in audacity. In
his eager search for advice, he had to strike a balance between the
daring Seward who at this moment built entirely on his own power of
political devination, and the cautious remainder of the Cabinet who
had their ears to the ground trying their