at he will be assailed by hypothetical and
ambiguous questions, worded to confuse him, and to mystify the jury.
Under these circumstances, therefore, he must necessarily think well,
before replying. He is in a court of law, under oath, and his
professional reputation is at stake. If he were not cautious in his
replies he would be worthless as a witness. He is justified, too, in
parrying questions which he knows are introduced merely to disguise
the truth, or to lead the minds of the jury into wrong channels. Mr.
Bliss has made much, or thinks that he has made much, of the answers
which Professor Orton gave. By specious reasoning he tries to prove
that Professor Orton believed that this woman died of an accumulation
of morphine, caused by a diseased condition of the kidneys. Mr. Bliss
tells us that he rests his case upon the evidence of our witnesses,
and largely upon this admission from Professor Orton. Now, as a matter
of fact, what Professor Orton did say cannot help the prisoner. He
admitted that other men have held the opinion that diseased kidneys
may cause an accumulation of morphine. But, gentlemen, how does that
effect this case? This very witness, upon whom Mr. Bliss is willing to
rely, tells us that whatever the possibilities might be in other
cases, it is his positive belief that this particular woman did not
die as claimed by the defence. He found poison in the stomach in
considerable quantities, whereas, where death occurs by a slow
accumulation, the drug would have passed beyond that organ, and none
would have been found there. So that we see, that what might be, and
what perhaps has been in the past, has no bearing on this case even
inferentially, because the same expert who says it is possible in
other cases, tells us plainly that it did not occur in this instance.

"And now, before speaking of the actual evidence in this case, let me
say a few words in regard to circumstantial evidence. It has been
common practice for counsel defending criminal cases to inveigh
against circumstantial evidence, until a suspicion has been engendered
in the public mind, that it is of dubious value. Indeed, the people,
knowing a little law, and understanding that all reasonable doubt must
be accorded to the prisoner, and, further, having imbibed the idea
that all circumstantial evidence contains a doubt, have come almost to
feel that a conviction obtained by such means is a miscarriage of
justice.

"This is entirely erron