stion of much interest had been started between General Halleck,
the general-in-chief of the army, and General Schenck, the commander of
the department, as to the best means of disposing the forces on this
road, for its complete security. General Halleck thought the proper mode
was to post his forces immediately on the line of the road, with
blockhouses and other defences for resisting the attacks of the enemy.
General Schenck, on the other hand, insisted upon holding a line some
distance to the south, with a view of watching the enemy, and meeting
his attacks before he reached the immediate vicinity of the road. This
difference of opinion had been the subject of frequent discussion
between these two officers, and gave rise to several telegraphic
communications from General Halleck to General Schenck, which the former
probably intended as orders, but which the latter, in view of their
peculiar phraseology, considered to be merely advisory, and not having
the character of peremptory orders. General Halleck expressed the
decided opinion, if he did not actually command, that the main body of
General Milroy's forces should be withdrawn from Winchester, and a small
force only left as an outpost to watch the enemy. General Schenck, on
the other hand, as he testified before the Court of Inquiry, believed
that any small force left at that point must inevitably be captured; and
he therefore determined to leave the whole garrison until the occasion
should occur for its withdrawal. He therefore gave no order to General
Milroy to evacuate his position until after the telegraphic wire had
been cut, when it was too late to communicate with him. On the contrary,
the last order received from General Schenck, at Winchester, was to hold
the position and await further orders.

The solicitude about the forces at Winchester arose from the anticipated
movements of Lee's rebel army. After the disastrous battle of
Chancellorsville, it soon became the subject of universal apprehension
that the victors in that field would make an attempt upon Washington,
and with that ultimate object would invade Maryland and Pennsylvania. In
the early days of June, the movements of the enemy on the Rappahannock
indicated some aggressive design, though the precise nature of the
enterprise about to be undertaken was unknown to our military
authorities, who waited with much anxiety for its development. A great
raid across the Potomac by Stuart's famous cavalry was