are asked to assist poor
nations by making an apportionment of goods and credit which the
individual members of the rich nations, the owners of the surplus,
would not make upon their own account. The edge of this issue should
not be blunted. If the people and government of America were only
concerned to let their individual citizens extort the highest prices
they could get for their surplus in the best markets, they would let
Central and Eastern Europe starve. If, however, they also take into
account the social, political, and economic reactions of a starving
Europe upon the future of a world in which they will have to live as
members of a world society which must grow ever closer in its physical,
economic, and spiritual contacts, they may decide differently. The
issue arises in the highest economic sphere, that of finance. Are the
nations and governments of the world sufficiently alive to the urgency
of the situation to enter into an organization of credit for the
emergency use of transport and for the distribution of foods and
materials on a basis of proved needs? The richer nations, in proportion
to their resources, would appear to be called upon to make a present
sacrifice for the benefit of the poorer nations in any such pooling of
credit facilities. That risk of sacrifice, however, need not be great,
and need not be felt at all by the individual members of rich nations,
provided that the hitherto unused resources of national credit can be
built into a strong structure of mutual support. If America were
invited to find adequate credits for Italian or Polish needs at the
present time, she might well hesitate. But if a consortium of European
governments, including Britain and the richer neutrals, were joint
guarantors of such advances, this cooeperative basis might furnish the
necessary confidence. It is not within my scope to discuss the various
forms a financial consortium might take; whether America, as
representative of the creditor nations, should enter such a consortium,
or should approach the organized credit of Europe in the capacity of a
friendly uncle. It must suffice here to indicate the moral test which
this grave issue presents to the nations regarded as economic powers.

Upon the policy adopted for this emergency will doubtless depend in
large measure the whole future of economic internationalism. For not
only does confidence grow with effective cooeperation, but upon this
post-war cooeperation between