uld open such commerce between the United
States and the French West India islands, as would enable our people
to supply themselves with the European and West India articles they
want, to send abroad the produce of the country, and by giving fresh
spirit and vigor to trade, would employ the paper currency, the want
of which employ has been one cause of its depreciation. The
maintenance of such a fleet in America, would circulate so many bills
of exchange as would likewise, in a great measure, relieve them from
that dangerous evil. And these bills would all return to France for
her manufactures, thereby cementing the connexion and extending the
trade between the two countries. Such a naval superiority would
contribute very much to extinguish the hopes of the remaining number
of persons who secretly wish, from sinister motives, to become again
subjected to Great Britain, and would enable the people of the several
States to give such consistency and stability to their infant
governments, as would contribute greatly to their internal repose, as
well as to the vigor of their future operations against the common
enemy. The late speedy supply and reparation of his Majesty's fleet at
Boston will show the advantages, which this country must enjoy in
carrying on a naval war, on a coast friendly to her and hostile to her
enemy. And these advantages will in future be more sensible, because
the appearance of the fleet before was unexpected, and the harvest in
that part of the country had been unfavorable. It is obvious to all
Europe, that nothing less is at stake than the dominion of the sea, at
least the superiority of naval power, and we cannot expect Great
Britain will ever give it up, without some decisive effort on the part
of France. With such an exertion as that of sending a superior fleet
to America, we see nothing in the course of human affairs, that can
possibly prevent France from obtaining such a naval superiority
without delay. Without it the war may languish for years, to the
infinite distress of our country, to the exhausting both of France and
England, and the question left to be decided by another war.

We are more earnest, in representing these things to your Excellency,
as all our correspondence from England, for some time, has uniformly
represented that the intention of the Cabinet is conformable to the
spirit of the manifesto, that all parties grow more and more out of
temper with the Americans; that it has beco