roposes to make would also authorize similar appropriations for the
improvement of all the other bays, inlets, and creeks, which may with
equal propriety be called harbors, and of all the rivers, important or
unimportant, in every part of the Union. To sanction the bill with such
provisions would be to concede the _principle_ that the Federal
Government possesses the power to expend the public money in a general
system of internal improvements, limited in its extent only by the
ever-varying discretion of successive Congresses and successive
Executives. It would be to efface and remove the limitations and
restrictions of power which the Constitution has wisely provided to
limit the authority and action of the Federal Government to a few
well-defined and specified objects. Besides these objections, the
practical evils which must flow from the exercise on the part of the
Federal Government of the powers asserted in this bill impress my mind
with a grave sense of my duty to avert them from the country as far as
my constitutional action may enable me to do so.

It not only leads to a consolidation of power in the Federal Government
at the expense of the rightful authority of the States, but its
inevitable tendency is to embrace objects for the expenditure of the
public money which are local in their character, benefiting but few at
the expense of the common Treasury of the whole. It will engender
sectional feelings and prejudices calculated to disturb the harmony of
the Union. It will destroy the harmony which should prevail in our
legislative councils.

It will produce combinations of local and sectional interests, strong
enough when united to carry propositions for appropriations of public
money which could not of themselves, and standing alone, succeed, and
can not fail to lead to wasteful and extravagant expenditures.

It must produce a disreputable scramble for the public money, by the
conflict which is inseparable from such a system between local and
individual interests and the general interest of the whole. It is unjust
to those States which have with their own means constructed their own
internal improvements to make from the common Treasury appropriations
for similar improvements in other States.

In its operation it will be oppressive and unjust toward those States
whose representatives and people either deny or doubt the existence of
the power or think its exercise inexpedient, and who, while they equally
con