ion has
attained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said with
reason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly
beseech him never to think of me_.

Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is
called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing
afflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon,
be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodness
sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest
friends?

79.

What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches without
intermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak and
short-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander at
random among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely hinders them from
following their inordinate appetites; who permits them to handle, without
precaution, murderous arms, at the risk of their life? What should we
think of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that
happens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderings
in the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father is
a madman, who unites injustice to folly. A God, who punishes faults, which
he could have prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and
equity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to
punish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to be
inherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish
him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. _To punish
weakness is the most unjust tyranny._ Is it not calumniating a just God,
to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in the present life?
How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, and
who, while they have not _grace_, cannot act otherwise than they do?

According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his present
state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace,
he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself,
or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or renders
him incapable of good, what becomes of the free-will of man? According to
such principles, man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for
the good he does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for the
evil he does, Go