for last night, not far from Guidizzuolo, two squadrons of
Italian light cavalry--Cavalleggieri di Lucca, if I am rightly
informed--at a sudden turn of the road leading from the last-named
village to Cerlongo, found themselves almost face to face with four
squadrons of uhlans. The Italians, without numbering their foes, set
spurs to their horses and fell like thunder on the Austrians, who, after
a fight which lasted more than half an hour, were put to flight, leaving
on the ground fifteen men hors de combat, besides twelve prisoners.

Whilst skirmishing of this kind is going on in the flat ground of
Lombardy which lies between the Mincio and the Chiese, a more decisive
action has been adopted by the Austrian corps which is quartered in the
Italian Tyrol and Valtellina. A few days ago it was generally believed
that the mission of this corps was only to oppose Garibaldi should he try
to force those Alpine passes. But now we suddenly hear that the Austrians
are already masters of Caffaro, Bagolino, Riccomassino, and Turano, which
points they are fortifying. This fact explains the last movements made by
Garibaldi towards that direction. But whilst the Austrians are massing
their troops on the Tyrolese Alps the revolution is spreading fast in the
more southern mountains of the Friuli and Cadorre, thus threatening the
flank and rear of their army in Venetia. This revolutionary movement may
not have as yet assumed great proportions, but as it is the effect of a
plan proposed beforehand it might become really imposing, more so as the
ranks of those Italian patriots are daily swollen by numerous deserters
and refractory men of the Venetian regiments of the Austrian army.

Although the main body of the Austrians seems to be still concentrated
between Peschiera and Verona, I should not wonder if they crossed the
Mincio either to-day or to-morrow, with the object of occupying the
heights of Volta, Cavriana, and Solferino, which, both by their position
and by the nature of the ground, are in themselves so many fortresses.
Supposing that the Italian army should decide for action--and there is
every reason to believe that such will be the case--it is not unlikely
that, as we had already a second battle at Custozza, we may have a second
one at Solferino.

That at the Italian headquarters something has been decided upon which
may hasten the forward movement of the army, I infer from the fact that
the foreign military commissioners at