ry Governor of Tennessee:

In addition to the matters contained in the orders and instructions given
you by the Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized to exercise such
powers as may be necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of
Tennessee to present such a republican form of State government as will
entitle the State to the guaranty of the United States therefor, and to
be protected under such State government by the United States against
invasion and domestic violence, all according to the fourth Section of the
fourth article of the Constitution of the United States.

A. LINCOLN

MILITARY STRATEGY

TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON D.C. September 19, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:

By General Meade's despatch to you of yesterday it appears that he desires
your views and those of the government as to whether he shall advance upon
the enemy. I am not prepared to order, or even advise, an advance in this
case, wherein I know so little of particulars, and wherein he, in the
field, thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small.

And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in
another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river,
substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own
capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's
infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per
cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far
as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000.

General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and
Washington, of the same classes, of well men, over 90,000. Neither can
bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a
percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three
men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing
ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the
three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on
the defensive also.

If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from
Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000
away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having
practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all
to employ twice as many men for that object as ar