citizens. The colonial government had empowered Washington, as
commander in chief, to commission some of these improvised war vessels
of the colonies to attack, in the service of the "continent," the
transports and small cruisers of the British, in order to secure powder
for the Continental army. It was not, however, until October of 1775
that the first official attempt towards the formation of a continental,
as opposed to a colonial, navy, was made. The large merchant marine put
at the disposal of the new government many excellent seamen and skippers
and a good number of ships, few of them, however, adapted for war. To
build regular warships on a large scale was impossible for a nation so
badly in need of funds. It was almost equally difficult to secure
officers trained in naval matters, for the marine captains, although as
a rule good seamen, were utterly lacking in naval knowledge and the
principles of organization.

In this state of affairs Paul Jones proved a very useful man. He was not
only a thorough seaman, but had studied the art of naval warfare, was in
some respects ahead of his time in his ideas of armament, and was
familiar with the organization and history of the British navy. In the
early development of our navy he played, therefore, an important part,
not only in equipping and arming ships for immediate service, and in
determining upon the most effective and practicable kind of vessels to
be built, but also in laying before the committee a statement of the
necessary requirements for naval officers.

To the request of Congress for reports, Jones answered with two
remarkable documents. One was a long, logical argument in favor of swift
frigates of a certain size, rather than ships of the line, and showed
thorough knowledge, not only of naval construction and cost of building,
but also of the general international situation, and the best method of
conducting the war on the sea. On the latter point he wrote: "Keeping
such a squadron in British waters, alarming their coasts, intercepting
their trade, and descending now and then upon their least protected
ports, is the only way that we, with our slender resources, can sensibly
affect our enemy by sea-warfare." This is an exact outline of the policy
which Jones and other United States captains actually carried out.

Jones also made the statement, wonderfully foreshadowing his own
exploits and their effect, that, "the capture ... of one or two of
their crack f