f affairs in the southwest. General
Maury, a capable officer, was at Mobile; Forrest, with his cavalry
division, I had sent into Tennessee; and a few scattered men were
watching the enemy in various quarters--all together hardly constituting
a command for a lieutenant-general, my rank. Unless Beauregard took
charge of Hood's army, there was nothing for him to do except to command
me. Here was a repetition of 1863. Then Johnston was sent with a roving
commission to command Bragg in Tennessee, Pemberton in Mississippi, and
others in sundry places. The result was that he commanded nobody, and,
when Pemberton was shut up in Vicksburg, found himself helpless, with a
handful of troops, at Jackson. To give an officer discretion to remove
another from command of an army in the field is to throw upon him the
responsibility of doing it, and this should be assumed by the
government, not left to an individual.

However, I urged on Beauregard the considerations mentioned in my
interview with President Davis, that Sherman had detached to look after
Forrest, was compelled to keep garrisons at many points from Atlanta to
Nashville, and, if forced to action fifty or sixty miles north of the
former place, would be weaker then than we could hope to find him later,
after he had accumulated supplies. I mentioned the little reenforcement
we could have at once from Mobile, my readiness to take any command,
division, brigade, or regiment to which he might assign me, and, above
all, the necessity of prompt action. There were two persons present,
Colonel Brent, of Beauregard's staff, and Mr. Charles Villere, a member
of the Confederate Congress from Louisiana. The former said all that was
proper for a staff officer in favor of my views; the latter,
Beauregard's brother-in-law, warmly urged their adoption. The General
ordered his horse, to visit Hood, and told me to await intelligence
from him. On his return from Hood, he informed me that the army was
moving to the northwest, and would cross the Tennessee river near the
Muscle Shoals. As this plan of campaign had met the sanction of
President Davis, and Hood felt confident of success, he declined to
interfere. I could not blame Beauregard; for it was putting a cruel
responsibility on him to supersede a gallant veteran, to whom fortune
had been adverse. There was nothing to be said and nothing to be done,
saving to discharge one's duty to the bitter end. Hood's line of march
would bring him within