He still retained some of the
early popularity gained at Sumter and Manassas, and would awaken a
certain enthusiasm. Apprehending no immediate danger for Mobile, I would
strip the place of everything except gunners and join Beauregard with
four thousand good troops. Even the smallest reenforcement is
inspiriting to a defeated army, and by seizing his railway we would
force Sherman to battle. Granting we would be whipped, we could fall
back to Blue Mountain without danger of pursuit, as the enemy was
chained to his line of supply, and we certainly ought to make the fight
hot enough to cripple him for a time and delay his projected movements.
At the same time, I did not disguise my conviction that the best we
could hope for was to protract the struggle until spring. It was for
statesmen, not soldiers, to deal with the future.

The President said Beauregard should come, and, after consultation with
Hood and myself, decide the movements of the army; but that he was
distressed to hear such gloomy sentiments from me. I replied that it was
my duty to express my opinions frankly to him, when he asked for them,
though there would be impropriety in giving utterance to them before
others; but I did not admit the gloom. In fact, I had cut into this game
with eyes wide open, and felt that in staking life, fortune, and the
future of my children, the chances were against success. It was not for
me, then, to whimper when the cards were bad; that was the right of
those who were convinced there would be no war, or at most a holiday
affair, in which everybody could display heroism. With much other talk
we wore through the night. In the morning he left, as he purposed, and I
returned to Selma. My next meeting with President Davis was at Fortress
Monroe, under circumstances to be related.

Some days at Selma were devoted to accumulation of supplies, and General
Maury was advised that he must be prepared to forward a part of his
command to that place, when a message from Beauregard informed me that
he was on the way to Blue Mountain and desired to meet me there. He had
not seen Hood, whose army, after an ineffectual attack on Altoona, had
left Sherman's line of communication, moved westward, and was now some
fifteen miles to the north of Blue Mountain. Having told me this,
Beauregard explained the orders under which he was acting. To my
disappointment, he had not been expressly assigned to command Hood's
army, but to the general direction o