ed. The old
name remained because men had not become conscious that they wanted a
new one; the old notion clung to the mind because nobody had seen
reason to be at the pains of examining it. We have had the process
clearly exemplified in the history of Testaments. A Will was at first
a simple conveyance of property. It was only the enormous practical
difference that gradually showed itself between this particular
conveyance and all others which caused it to be regarded separately,
and even as it was, centuries elapsed before the ameliorators of law
cleared away the useless encumbrance of the nominal mancipation, and
consented to care for nothing in the Will but the expressed intentions
of the Testator. It is unfortunate that we cannot track the early
history of Contracts with the same absolute confidence as the early
history of Wills, but we are not quite without hints that contracts
first showed themselves through the _nexum_ being put to a new use and
afterwards obtained recognition as distinct transactions through the
important practical consequences of the experiment. There is some, but
not very violent, conjecture in the following delineation of the
process. Let us conceive a sale for ready money as the normal type of
the Nexum. The seller brought the property of which he intended to
dispose--a slave, for example--the purchaser attended with the rough
ingots of copper which served for money--and an indispensable
assistant, the _libripens_, presented himself with a pair of scales.
The slave with certain fixed formalities was handed over to the
vendee--the copper was weighed by the _libripens_ and passed to the
vendor. So long as the business lasted it was a _nexum_, and the
parties were _nexi_; but the moment it was completed, the _nexum_
ended, and the vendor and purchaser ceased to bear the name derived
from their momentary relation. But now, let us move a step onward in
commercial history. Suppose the slave transferred, but the money not
paid. In _that_ case, the _nexum_ is finished, so far as the seller is
concerned, and when he has once handed over his property, he is no
longer _nexus_; but, in regard to the purchaser, the _nexum_
continues. The transaction, as to his part of it, is incomplete, and
he is still considered to be _nexus_. It follows, therefore, that the
same term described the Conveyance by which the right of property was
transmitted, and the personal obligation of the debtor for the unpaid
purcha