tachment to hover about the British rear, the
main body of the army moved towards the Hudson.
The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the conduct of his
troops in this action. Their behaviour, he said, after recovering from
the first surprise occasioned by the unexpected retreat of the
advanced corps, could not be surpassed. General Wayne was particularly
mentioned; and the artillery were spoken of in terms of high praise.
The loss of the Americans in the battle of Monmouth was eight officers
and sixty-one privates killed, and about one hundred and sixty
wounded. Among the slain were Lieutenant Colonel Bonner of
Pennsylvania, and Major Dickenson of Virginia, both of whom were much
regretted. One hundred and thirty were missing; but a considerable
number of these afterwards rejoined their regiments.
In his official letter, Sir Henry Clinton states his dead and missing
at four officers, and one hundred and eighty-four privates. His
wounded at sixteen officers and one hundred and fifty-four privates.
This account, so far as respects the dead, can not be correct, as four
officers and two hundred and forty-five privates were buried on the
field by persons appointed for the purpose, who made their report to
the Commander-in-chief; and some few were afterwards found, so as to
increase the number to nearly three hundred. The uncommon heat of the
day proved fatal to several on both sides.
As usual, when a battle has not been decisive, both parties claimed
the victory. In the early part of the day, the advantage was certainly
with the British; in the latter part, it may be pronounced with equal
certainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained their
ground, repulsed the enemy, were prevented only by the night, and by
the retreat of the hostile army from renewing the action, and suffered
less in killed and wounded than their adversaries.
It is true that Sir Henry Clinton effected what he states to have been
his principal object,--the safety of his baggage. But when it is
recollected that the American officers had decided against hazarding
an action, that this advice must have trammeled the conduct, and
circumscribed the views of the Commander-in-chief, he will be admitted
to have effected no inconsiderable object in giving the American arms
that appearance of superiority which was certainly acquired by this
engagement.
Independent of the loss sustained in the action, the British army was
considerably
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