ere happily accomplished. The order was
revoked, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.

[Footnote 35: Previous to the reception of the account of
this order, the opinion of the secretary had been in favour
of ratifying the treaty.]

[Sidenote: The treaty unpopular in the United States.]

The President was most probably determined to adopt this course by the
extreme intemperance with which the treaty was opposed, and the rapid
progress which this violence was apparently making. It was obvious
that, unless this temper could be checked, it would soon become so
extensive, and would arrive at such a point of fury, as to threaten
dangerous consequences. It was obviously necessary either to attempt a
diminution of its action by rendering its exertions hopeless, and by
giving to the treaty the weight of his character and influence, or to
determine ultimately to yield to it. A species of necessity therefore
seems to have been created for abandoning the idea, if it was ever
taken up, of making the ratification of the treaty dependent on the
revocation of the provision order.

The soundness of the policy which urged this decisive measure was
proved by the event. The confidence which was felt in the judgment and
virtue of the chief magistrate, induced many, who, swept away by the
popular current, had yielded to the common prejudices, to re-examine,
and discard opinions which had been too hastily embraced; and many
were called forth by a desire to support the administration in
measures actually adopted, to take a more active part in the general
contest than they would otherwise have pursued. The consequence was,
that more moderate opinions respecting the treaty began to prevail.

In a letter from Mount Vernon of the 20th of September, addressed to
General Knox, who had communicated to him the change of opinion which
was appearing in the eastern states, the President expressed in warm
terms the pleasure derived from that circumstance, and added: "Next to
a conscientious discharge of my public duties, to carry along with me
the approbation of my constituents, would be the highest gratification
of which my mind is susceptible. But the latter being secondary, I can
not make the former yield to it, unless some criterion more infallible
than partial (if they are not party) meetings can be discovered as the
touchstone of public sentiment. If any person on earth could, or the
great power above would, erect