nd were confined to the Mediterranean by a
Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after
they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to
capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to
the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of
success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand
that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade,
and were afraid of the expense of a small armament.

It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the
operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation,
and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the
former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the
armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail.

The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national
dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the
United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But
there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations
in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers.
If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish
that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them.
If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the
depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection
would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the
nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and
leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs.
While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it
would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give.

With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any
power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend
altogether on any foreign nation.

To the argument that the force was incompetent to the object, it was
answered, that, from the documents before them, and from the diligent
inquiries of a large committee, the number and strength of the
Algerine corsairs had been ascertained, and the armament contemplated
in the bill was believed to be sufficient. If gentlemen thought
differently, it was surprising that they did not move to augment it.

The expense of the frigates had been strongly urged. But the saving in
insurance, in s