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nciples are synthetic, and here, as will be shown, it is not experience but "pure intuition" which permits us to go beyond the concept and add a new mark to it.] [Footnote 2: The Scholastics applied the term _a priori_ to knowledge from causes (from that which precedes), and _a posteriori_ to knowledge from effects. Kant, following Leibnitz and Lambert, uses the terms to designate the antithesis, knowledge from reason and knowledge from experience. An _a priori_ judgment is a judgment obtained without the aid of experience. When the principle from which it is derived is also independent of experience it is absolutely _a priori_, otherwise it is relatively _a priori_.] Two sciences discuss the _how_, and a third the _if_ of such judgments, which, at the same time, are ampliative and absolutely universal and necessary. The first two sciences are pure mathematics and pure natural science, of which the former is protected against doubt concerning its legitimacy by its evident character, and the latter, by the constant possibility of verification in experience; each, moreover, can point to the continuous course of its development. All this is absent in the third science, metaphysics, as science of the suprasensible, and to its great disadvantage. Experiential verification is in the nature of things denied to a presumptive knowledge of that which is beyond experience; it lacks evidence to such an extent that there is scarcely a principle to be found to which all metaphysicians assent, much less a metaphysical text-book to compare with Euclid; there is so little continuous advance that it is rather true that the later comers are likely to overthrow all that their predecessors have taught. In metaphysics, therefore, which, it must be confessed, is actual as a natural tendency, the question is not, as in the other two sciences, concerning the grounds of its legitimacy, but concerning this legitimacy itself. Mathematics and pure physics form synthetic judgments _a priori_, and metaphysics does the same. But the principles of the two former are unchallenged, while those of the third are not. In the former case the subject for investigation is, Whence this authority? in the latter case, Is she thus authorized? Thus the main question, How are synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible? divides into the subordinate questions, How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure natural science possible, and, How is metaphysics (in two sen
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