Philosophia.]

Arms, eloquence, and the study of the civil law, promoted a citizen to
the honors of the Roman state; and the three professions were
sometimes more conspicuous by their union in the same character. In
the composition of the edict, a learned praetor gave a sanction and
preference to his private sentiments; the opinion of a censor, or a
counsel, was entertained with respect; and a doubtful interpretation of
the laws might be supported by the virtues or triumphs of the civilian.
The patrician arts were long protected by the veil of mystery; and in
more enlightened times, the freedom of inquiry established the general
principles of jurisprudence. Subtile and intricate cases were elucidated
by the disputes of the forum: rules, axioms, and definitions, [59] were
admitted as the genuine dictates of reason; and the consent of the legal
professors was interwoven into the practice of the tribunals. But these
interpreters could neither enact nor execute the laws of the republic;
and the judges might disregard the authority of the Scaevolas
themselves, which was often overthrown by the eloquence or sophistry
of an ingenious pleader. [60] Augustus and Tiberius were the first
to adopt, as a useful engine, the science of the civilians; and their
servile labors accommodated the old system to the spirit and views of
despotism. Under the fair pretence of securing the dignity of the art,
the privilege of subscribing legal and valid opinions was confined to
the sages of senatorian or equestrian rank, who had been previously
approved by the judgment of the prince; and this monopoly prevailed,
till Adrian restored the freedom of the profession to every citizen
conscious of his abilities and knowledge. The discretion of the praetor
was now governed by the lessons of his teachers; the judges were
enjoined to obey the comment as well as the text of the law; and the use
of codicils was a memorable innovation, which Augustus ratified by the
advice of the civilians. [61] [6111]

[Footnote 59: We have heard of the Catonian rule, the Aquilian
stipulation, and the Manilian forms, of 211 maxims, and of 247
definitions, (Pandect. l. i. tit. xvi. xvii.)]

[Footnote 60: Read Cicero, l. i. de Oratore, Topica, pro Murena.]

[Footnote 61: See Pomponius, (de Origine Juris Pandect. l. i. tit. ii.
leg. 2, No 47,) Heineccius, (ad Institut. l. i. tit. ii. No. 8, l. ii.
tit. xxv. in Element et Antiquitat.,) and Gravina, (p. 41--45.) Yet the
mon