ombing
with hand-grenades, of which the enemy had several patterns, all
effective. His most used type was a grey tin cylinder, holding about a
pound of explosive, and screwed to a wooden baton or handle about a
foot long for the greater convenience of throwing.

* * * * *

Early in the spring of 1916, it was determined that an attack should
be made by our armies upon these lines of the enemy, so as to bring
about a removal of the enemy guns and men, then attacking the French
at Verdun and the Russians on the eastern front.

Preparations for this attack were made throughout the first half of
the year. New roads were cut, old roads were remetalled, new lines of
railways were surveyed and laid, and supplies and munitions were
accumulated not far from the front. Pumping stations were built and
wells were sunk for the supply of water to the troops during the
battle. Fresh divisions were brought up and held ready behind the
line. An effort was made to check the enemy's use of aeroplanes. In
June, our Air Service in the Somme sector made it so difficult for the
enemy to take photographs over our lines that his knowledge of our
doings along the front of the planned battle was lessened and
thwarted. At the same time, many raids were made by our aeroplanes
upon the enemy's depots and magazines behind his front. Throughout
June, our infantry raided the enemy line in many places to the north
of the planned battle. It seems possible that these raids led him to
think that our coming attack would be made wholly to the north of the
Ancre River.

[Illustration: The Assault on July 1, 1916, at La Boisselle]

During the latter half of June, our armies concentrated a very great
number of guns behind the front of the battle. The guns were of every
kind, from the field gun to the heaviest howitzer. Together they made
what was at that time by far the most terrible concentration of
artillery ever known upon a battlefield. Vast stores of shells of
every known kind were made ready, and hourly increased.

As the guns came into battery, they opened intermittent fire, so that,
by the 20th of June, the fire along our front was heavier than it had
been before. At the same time, the fire of the machine guns and trench
mortars in our trenches became hotter and more constant. On the 24th
of June this fire was increased, by system, along the front designed
for the battle, and along the French front to the south of