wages, should, from and after the first of May, in the year one thousand
seven hundred and fifty-seven, be valid, notwithstanding any rate
established, or to be established; but that these contracts or
agreements should extend only to the actual prices or rates of
workmanship or wages, and not to the payment thereof in any other manner
than in money; and that if any clothier should refuse or neglect to pay
the weaver the wages or price agreed on, in money, within two days after
the work should be performed and delivered, the same being demanded, he
should forfeit forty shillings for every such offence.]
[Footnote 401: Note 3 H, p. 401. Admiral F..... s's _reasons for not
signing the warrant for admiral Byng's execution._
"It may be thought great presumption in me to differ from so great
authority as that of the twelve judges; but when a man is called upon
to sign his name to an act which is to give authority to the shedding
of blood, he ought to be guided by his own conscience, and not by the
opinions of other men.
"In the case before us, it is not the merit of admiral Byng that I
consider; whether he deserves death or not, is not a question for me to
decide; but whether or not his life can be taken away by the sentence
pronounced on him by the court-martial, and after having so clearly
explained their motives for pronouncing such a sentence, is the point
which alone has employed my serious consideration.
"The twelfth article of war, on which admiral Byng's sentence is
grounded, says (according to my understanding of its meaning), 'That
every person, who, in time of action, shall withdraw, keep back, or not
come into fight, or do his utmost, &c. through motives of cowardice,
negligence, or disaffection, shall suffer death.' The court-martial
does, in express words, acquit admiral Byng of cowardice and
disaffection, and does not name the word negligence. Admiral Byng does
not, as I conceive, fall under the letter or description of the twelfth
article of war. It may be said that negligence is implied, though
the word is not mentioned, otherwise the court-martial would not have
brought his offence under the twelfth article, having acquitted him
of cowardice and disaffection. But it must be acknowledged that the
negligence implied cannot be wilful negligence; for wilful negligence in
admiral Byng's situation, must have proceeded either from cowardice
or disaffection, and he is expressly acquitted of both these cri
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