tly towards the evening, the boats
were re-shipped, and the fleet obliged to quit the land in order to
avoid the dangers of a lee-shore. Next day, the weather being more
moderate, they returned to the same station, and orders were given to
prepare for a descent; but the duke of Marlborough having taken a view
of the coast in an open cutter, accompanied by commodore Howe, thought
proper to waive the attempt. Their next step was to bear away before the
wind for Cherbourg, in the neighbourhood of which place the fleet
came to anchor. Here some of the transports received the fire of six
different batteries; and a considerable body of troops appeared in arms
to dispute the landing; nevertheless, the general resolved that the
forts Querqueville, l'Hommet, and Gallet, should be attacked in the
night by the first regiment of guards. The soldiers were actually
distributed in the flat-bottomed boats, and every preparation made for
this enterprise, when the wind began to blow with such violence, that
the troops could not be landed without the most imminent danger and
difficulty, nor properly sustained in case of a repulse, even if the
disembarkation could have been effected. This attempt, therefore, was
laid aside, but at the same time a resolution taken to stand in
towards the shore with the whole fleet, to cover a general landing.
A disposition was made accordingly; but the storm increasing, the
transports ran foul of each other, and the ships were exposed to all
the perils of a lee-shore, for the gale blew directly upon the coast;
besides, the provisions began to fail, and the hay for the horses was
almost consumed. These concurring reasons induced the commanders to
postpone the disembarkation to a more favourable opportunity. The fleet
stood out to sea, and the tempest abating, they steered for the Isle of
Wight, and next day anchored at St. Helen's. Such was the issue of an
enterprise achieved with considerable success, if we consider the damage
done to the enemy's shipping, and the other objects which the minister
had in view; namely, to secure the navigation of the channel, and make
a diversion in favour of the German allies, by alarming the French king,
and obliging him to employ a great number of troops to defend his
coast from insult and invasion; but whether such a mighty armament was
necessary for the accomplishment of these petty aims, and whether the
same armament might not have been employed in executing schemes of
i