The only rightful
subject then of arrest and delivery, for which we have need, is
murder. Ought we to wish to strain the natural right of arresting and
re-delivering fugitives to other cases?

The punishment of all real crimes is certainly desirable, as a security
to society; the security is greater in proportion as the chances of
avoiding punishment are less. But does the fugitive from his country
avoid punishment? He incurs exile, not voluntary, but under a moral
necessity as strong as physical. Exile, in some countries, has been
the highest punishment allowed by the laws. To most minds it is next to
death; to many beyond it. The fugitive indeed is not of the latter; he
must estimate it somewhat less than death. It may be said that to some,
as foreigners, it is no punishment.

Answer. These cases are few. Laws are to be made for the mass of cases.

The object of a convention then, in other cases, would be, that the
fugitive might not avoid the difference between exile and the legal
punishment of the case. Now in what case would this difference be so
important, as to overweigh even the single inconvenience of multiplying
compacts?

1. _Treason_. This, when real, merits the highest punishment. But most
codes extend their definitions of treason to acts not really against
one's country. They do not distinguish between acts against the
government and acts against the oppressions of the government: the
latter are virtues; yet have furnished more victims to the executioner
than the former; because real treasons are rare, oppressions frequent.
The unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny have been the chief martyrs
of treason-laws in all countries.

Reformation of government with our neighbors; being as much wanted now
as reformation of religion is, or ever was any where, we should not wish
then, to give up to the executioner, the patriot who fails, and flees to
us. Treasons then, taking the simulated with the real, are sufficiently
punished by exile.

2. Crimes against _property_; the punishment in most countries,
immensely disproportionate to the crime.

In England, and probably in Canada, to steal a horse is death, the first
offence; to steal above the value of twelve pence is death, the second
offence. All excess of punishment is a crime. To remit a fugitive to
excessive punishment is to be accessary to the crime. Ought we to wish
for the obligation, or the right to do it? Better, on the whole, to
consider these c