er than with a part only. The possible error remains even
then; but a practical mind will always accept the risk of error when it
has made every possible correction. A rational will is not a will that
has reason for its basis or that possesses any other proof that its
realisation would be possible or good than the oracle which a living
will inspires and pronounces. The rationality possible to the will lies
not in its source but in its method. An ideal cannot wait for its
realisation to prove its validity. To deserve adhesion it needs only to
be adequate as an ideal, that is, to express completely what the soul at
present demands, and to do justice to all extant interests.

CHAPTER XI--SOME ABSTRACT CONDITIONS OF THE IDEAL

[Sidenote: The ultimate end a resultant.]

Reason's function is to embody the good, but the test of excellence is
itself ideal; therefore before we can assure ourselves that reason has
been manifested in any given case we must make out the reasonableness of
the ideal that inspires us. And in general, before we can convince
ourselves that a Life of Reason, or practice guided by science and
directed toward spiritual goods, is at all worth having, we must make
out the possibility and character of its ultimate end. Yet each ideal is
its own justification; so that the only sense in which an ultimate end
can be established and become a test of general progress is this: that a
harmony and co-operation of impulses should be conceived, leading to the
maximum satisfaction possible in the whole community of spirits affected
by our action. Now, without considering for the present any concrete
Utopia, such, for instance, as Plato's Republic or the heavenly
beatitude described by theologians, we may inquire what formal qualities
are imposed on the ideal by its nature and function and by the relation
it bears to experience and to desire.

[Sidenote: Demands the substance of ideals.]

The ideal has the same relation to given demands that the reality has to
given perceptions. In the face of the ideal, particular demands forfeit
their authority and the goods to which a particular being may aspire
cease to be absolute; nay, the satisfaction of desire comes to appear an
indifferent or unholy thing when compared or opposed to the ideal to be
realised. So, precisely, in perception, flying impressions come to be
regarded as illusory when contrasted with a stable conception of
reality. Yet of course flying impres