We proceeded on our voyage without any remarkable event till we
anchored off Cape Virgin Mary, where we saw the Patagonians, of which I
have given some account in a letter to Dr Matty, which was published in
the sixtieth volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society, and which
it is not necessary here to repeat, as it is in general the same as
those which have been given by Commodore Byron and Captain Wallis.

When we entered the Streight, I was ordered to keep ahead of the Dolphin
and the store-ship, to pilot them through the shoals; but my ship worked
so ill, that we could but very seldom make her tack without the help of
a boat to tow her round: However, with much labour, and at no
inconsiderable risk, we anchored in Port Famine, on Friday the 26th of
December. At this place we unhung our rudder, and added a piece of wood
to it, in hopes that by making it broader, we should obtain some
advantage in working the ship; in which, however, we were altogether
disappointed.

After many difficulties and dangers, we got into Island Bay on the 17th
of February; and before we made sail again, I represented the condition
of my ship by letter to Captain Wallis, and requested him to consider
what was best for his majesty's service, whether she should be
dismissed, or continue the voyage. Captain Wallis replied, that as the
lords of the Admiralty had ordered the Swallow on this service, with the
nature of which I was well acquainted, he did not think himself at
liberty to alter her destination.[54]

[Footnote 54: This seems quite irrational. Would Captain W. have thought
himself bound "to his destination," in circumstances, which, to the
judgment of his own mind, and in the unanimous opinion of his officers,
rendered success beyond the accomplishment of human agents? Surely
not--Then why judge by any other rule than that of practicability, when
another person, one under his command, was concerned? Some discretionary
power is obviously implied in every system of orders intended for
rational and accountable beings. The use made of it is one of the data,
on which the determination of the degrees of merit or demerit as to
conduct, must be founded. On no other principle than one involving some
liberty, nay some duty of judging, can the intelligence of mankind be
availing in the execution of projects. Divine authority alone,
unequivocally made known, can dispense with acquiescence to the demands
of reason, or render inefficient the