to the rescue, German boots might
have tramped down through the Place de la Republique to the Place
de la Concorde, and German horses might have been stabled in the
Palais des Beaux-Arts. I am sure of that, because I saw the beginning
of demoralization, the first signs of an enormous tragedy, creeping
closer to an expectant city.

In spite of the optimism of French officers and men, an optimism as
strong as religious faith, I believe now, searching back to facts, that it
was not justified by the military situation. It was justified only by the
miracle that followed faith. Von Kluck does not seem to have known
that the French army was in desperate need of those twenty-four
hours which he gave them by his hesitation. If he had come straight
on for Paris with the same rapidity as his men had marched in earlier
stages and with the same resolve to smash through regardless of
cost, the city would have been his and France would have reeled
under the blow. The psychological effect of the capital being in the
enemy's hands would have been worth more to them at this stage of
the war than the annihilation of an army corps. It would have been a
moral debacle for the French people, who had been buoyed up with
false news and false hopes until their Government had fled to
Bordeaux, realizing the gravity of the peril. The Terrible Year would
have seemed no worse than this swift invasion of Paris, and the
temperament of the nation, in spite of the renewal of its youth, had
not changed enough to resist this calamity with utter stoicism. I know
the arguments of the strategists, who point out that Von Kluck could
not afford to undertake the risk of entering Paris while an undefeated
army remained on his flank. They are obvious arguments, thoroughly
sound to men who play for safety, but all records of great captains of
war prove that at a decisive moment they abandon the safe and
obvious game for a master-stroke of audacity, counting the risks and
taking them, and striking terror into the hearts of their enemy by the
very shock of their contempt for caution. Von Kluck could have
entered and held Paris with twenty thousand men. That seems to me
beyond dispute by anyone who knows the facts. With the mass of
men at his disposal he could have driven a wedge between Paris and
the French armies of the left and centre, and any attempt on their part
to pierce his line and cut his communications would have been
hampered by the deadly peril of findi