d to leave Mr. Lincoln's offer untested. Mr. Davis
therefore sent north his Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, with
two other high officials of the Confederate government, armed with
instructions which aimed to be liberal enough to gain them admittance
to the Union lines, and yet distinctly announced that they came "for the
purpose of securing peace to the two countries." This difference in the
wording of course doomed their mission in advance, for the government
at Washington had never admitted that there were "two countries," and to
receive the messengers of Jefferson Davis on any such terms would be to
concede practically all that the South asked.

When they reached the Union lines the officer who met them informed
them that they could go no farther unless they accepted the President's
conditions. They finally changed the form of their request, and were
taken to Fortress Monroe. Meantime Mr. Lincoln had sent Secretary Seward
to Fortress Monroe with instructions to hear all they might have to say,
but not to definitely conclude anything. On learning the true nature
of their errand he was about to recall him, when he received a telegram
from General Grant, regretting that Mr. Lincoln himself could not see
the commissioners, because, to Grant's mind, they seemed sincere.

Anxious to do everything he could in the interest of peace, Mr. Lincoln,
instead of recalling Secretary Seward, telegraphed that he would himself
come to Fortress Monroe, and started that same night. The next morning,
February 3, 1865, he and the Secretary of State received the rebel
commissioners on board the President's steamer, the River Queen.

This conference between the two highest officials of the United States
government, and three messengers from the Confederacy, bound, as the
President well knew beforehand, by instructions which made any practical
outcome impossible, brings out, in strongest relief, Mr. Lincoln's
kindly patience, even toward the rebellion. He was determined to leave
no means untried that might, however remotely, lead to peace. For four
hours he patiently answered the many questions they asked him, as to
what would probably be done on various subjects if the South submitted;
pointing out always the difference between the things that he had the
power to decide, and those that must be submitted to Congress; and
bringing the discussion back, time and again, to the three points
absolutely necessary to secure peace--Union, fre