e
rigid uniformity with which the military operations have been
continually pushed back upon the soil of the seceded States, and
maintained there in spite of all their efforts to the contrary. In all
instances, their incursions into the States mentioned, though projected
upon the grandest scale and with the most hopeful results, have
eventually proved to be miserable failures; and if they have not always,
or even in any instance, met with the severe punishment that ought to
have followed them, it was only because the attempts were too
preposterous to have been anticipated by a vigilant foe, and we were too
confident in our strength to make the preparation necessary properly to
repel them. With such experience on our part, after two years of
constant efforts to invade our territories successfully met and more
than merely repelled, it would be evidence of gross inefficiency and
weakness in us, to permit the enemy to gain even a temporary foothold in
any one of the loyal States, or even to attempt it, without the complete
overthrow and destruction of the invading force. Our manifest policy is
to attack them in their own country, and to hold them there, until we
can annihilate their military power. We have successfully accomplished
one half this programme; but so far we have failed in the other. However
humiliating may be the admission, we are nevertheless compelled to make
it. We have not yet overthrown their main armies in any decisive
engagements; although we have achieved many important successes and made
some fatal encroachments on the territory of the enemy, crippling his
power and cutting off his resources. From the very inception of the
rebellion, its field of operations has been gradually contracting. One
after another the strongholds of the enemy have fallen into our hands,
and whole regions of his territory have been over run and occupied by
our forces, with every appearance of having been finally and forever
lost to them. Our standards, advancing steadily, though slowly, have not
receded anywhere, except temporarily, and then only, it would seem, to
make still further advance into the very heart of the confederacy. With
some few exceptions, such as the withdrawal of the army from the
Peninsula, this has been the history of the last two years; and there is
nothing in the present condition of affairs which would appear to
forebode a departure from this uniform progress of our arms. We may
complain, perhaps justly,