Therefore the number of the predestined is not
certain.

Obj. 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
by God cannot be certain.

Obj. 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of
nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more
saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matt. 7:13,14: "For
wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and
many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait
is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!"
Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not
certain.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number
of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
diminished."

_I answer that,_ The number of the predestined is certain. Some have
said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be
saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the
certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6).
Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is
certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be
observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to
God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows
how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain
and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His
deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which
we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as
is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite
(Q. 7, AA. 2 ,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in
his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts,
which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the
whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but
only on account of something else, he does not select any definite
number _per se_; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are
necessary on account of that other