ses, took the field in far greater force than the allies; and
instead of the brilliant offensive campaign he had planned,
Marlborough had to stand on the defensive.

The gallantry of his English troops, and the effect which Blenheim
had produced upon the morale of the French, enabled him to hold the
ground won, and to obtain several minor successes; one notably at
the Dyle, where Villeroi's troops were driven out of lines
considered impregnable, but where the pusillanimity and ill will of
the Dutch generals prevented any substantial results being
obtained; but no important action took place, and the end of 1705
found things in nearly the same state that 1704 had left them.

The non success of the campaign undid some of the harm which the
success of that of 1704 had effected. In Flanders the genius of the
duke had enabled the allies to maintain their ground; but on the
Rhine they had done badly, and in Italy the French had carried all
before them. Therefore while after Blenheim an apathy had fallen on
the victors, so now the extent of the danger moved them to fresh
exertions.

Marlborough, after seeing his army into winter quarters, visited
the capitals of Vienna, Berlin, and the Hague, and again by the
charm of his manner succeeded in pacifying jealousies, in healing
quarrels, and in obtaining the promises of vigorous action and
larger armaments in the spring.

The bad conduct of the Dutch generals had created such a general
cry of indignation through Europe, that the States General were
compelled, by the pressure of public opinion, to dismiss several of
the men who had most distinguished themselves by thwarting the
plans of Marlborough, and interposing on every occasion between him
and victory. Consequently the campaign of 1706 seemed likely to
open with far brighter prospects of success than its predecessors
had done.

Suddenly, however, all the arrangements broke down. The
Imperialists had just suffered another reverse in Italy; and
matters looked so desperate there, that Marlborough proposed to
pass the Alps with an army of 40,000 men to their assistance, and
there, as he would have the warm cooperation of Prince Eugene
instead of the cowardice of the Dutch generals, and the incapacity
and obstinacy of the Prince of Baden, he anticipated the complete
discomfiture of the French.

In these hopes, however, he was thwarted. The Prince of Baden would
do nothing beyond defending his own dominion. The cabinets of