he advised
her to vote, believing that the laws and Constitution of the United
States gave her full authority. He then proposed to call Miss Anthony
to testify as to the intention or belief under which she voted, but the
Court held she was not competent as a witness in her own behalf. After
making this decision, the Court then admitted all the testimony, as
reported, which she gave on the preliminary examination before the
commissioner, in spite of her counsel's protest against accepting the
version which that officer took of her evidence. The prosecution simply
alleged the fact of her having voted. Mr. Selden then addressed the
judge and jury in a masterly argument of over three hours' duration,
beginning:

The defendant is indicted under the 19th Section of the Act of
Congress of May 31, 1870 (16th St. at L., 144), for "voting without
having a lawful right to vote." The words of the statute, so far as
they are material in this case, are as follows:

"If at any election for representative or delegate in the Congress
of the United States, any person shall knowingly ... vote without
having a lawful right to vote ... every such person shall be deemed
guilty of a crime ... and on conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years, or by both, in the discretion of the Court,
and shall pay the costs of prosecution."

The only alleged ground of illegality of the defendant's vote is
that she is a woman. If the same act had been done by her brother
under the same circumstances, the act would have been not only
innocent but honorable and laudable; but having been done by a
woman it is said to be a crime. The crime therefore consists not in
the act done but in the simple fact that the person doing it was a
woman and not a man. I believe this is the first instance in which
a woman has been arraigned in a criminal court merely on account of
her sex....

Women have the same interest that men have in the establishment and
maintenance of good government; they are to the same extent as men
bound to obey the laws; they suffer to the same extent by bad laws,
and profit to the same extent by good laws; and upon principles of
equal justice, as it would seem, should be allowed, equally with
men, to express their preference in the choice of law-makers and
rule